Religious Territorialism: Lessons from India’s “Fake Muslims” versus “Real Muslims”

“We can see your name, and it is clear the agenda you are trying to spread. Average zealot Mullah”—this is just one exemplar of the many comments I have received as Mohammad Siddiqui, voicing my concerns about India’s direction. Yet, it is commonplace today for Hindutva nationalists to harass dissenters endlessly.

And worse is to consider that this isn’t limited to politics. Scrolling on Instagram, one could find several Hindutva chants and Islamophobic remarks even on a cooking video just because the content creator wears a hijab. These Hindutva nationalist tactics corner and exclude minorities and dissenters from conversations and force them into more private spaces.

As we prepare for India’s 76th Republic Day this year, I can’t help but think about what the realities on the ground are. Sure, this is the day to commemorate when our constitution “went into effect.” But to what extent is it really in effect? For whose defense is it most often invoked? Are those who are governing us at present happy with what the potentials of this constitution are?

For many, this post will read as another annoying piece that “fails to read the room” or that shuns all celebration using “propaganda.” But are we fulfilling our duties as a cohesive community if, in the path of celebrating a commemoration event, we shut down the voices of those who are less privileged?

I am also in a privileged position myself; many of those with whom I am in conversation are also privileged in that we either do not live in India anymore, live in safer parts, or have the resources to move. Many of us are South Asians in the Gulf or in the United States, and this allows us to observe interesting patterns. Why are India’s relations with the Gulf countries improving while the average ultranationalist continues to hate and hurt Muslims? Why do American Indians who have never lived in Modi’s India love Modi so much?

It’s because Hindutva nationalists are weaponizing religious rhetoric to construct the identity of a “true Indian” as one who is the ideal good Hindu that they envision. Insofar as their opposition is against those they consider as Muslims, anti-national, and outsiders, the “Hindu” and “Indian” identity seem monolithic. But even here, there are internal contradictions within their nationalist vision. It is not so much of a vision to protect all Hindus as much as it is one that serves the politically-aligned upper caste Hindi-speaking Hindus or the silent centrists who want to take the path of least resistance or criticize both sides equally.

But that’s just to clarify that what appears religious at its forefront, is so not so much about religion as much as it is about redefining Indian “ethnicity” and finding ways to reinforce the economic power within the top 1%.

Here, I want to present my reflections on how this construction of ethnicity happens. Specifically, I highlight that Hindutva nationalists use dehumanizing language that render non-Hindus and eventually dissenting lower-caste Hindus as non-Indian entirely. Firstly, Hindutva nationalists are differentiating between who they call “real Muslims” (Arabs) and “converted Muslims” (India’s Muslims). Secondly, ultranationalists are increasingly overtly supportive of religious territorialism and deploy exclusive language to silence dissenters.

The UAE inaugurated the BAPS Mandir in Abu Dhabi in February 2024. This move was one of many moments where Hindutva nationalists celebrated an Islamic Gulf country, despite not necessarily residing there. Simultaneously, Hindutva nationalists also celebrated the inauguration of the Ayodhya Mandir on the site of the illegally demolished Babri Masjid, and called for the destruction of many other Masjids, labelling any dissenters to this as anti-Hindu and anti-India.

Months ago, as videos of Diwali celebrations in Dubai, as has been customary for years, circulated, a flurry of Hindutva nationalists resident in India took to comment sections of posts, claiming how “converted Muslims are angry!!” – even though this claim, like many accusations, is a response to an alleged problem that does not exist at the scale it is claimed to exist. Think about it, as UAE residents, do any of us feel like there is a pushback against Diwali as much as there is against meat consumption in many regions in India?

India’s diplomatic relationship with the Gulf states is also strong, with charismatic pictures of leaders shaking hands or hugging being popular. The justification is clear—the Arabs are “original” or “real” Muslims, so they act in hospitality, while Indians, whom the nationalists define as violent, exclusive, and sub-human, are such because they are “fake” or “converted” Muslims.

Indeed, the revisionism of these so-called historic claims is obvious: we know that Muslim communities have been in India as traders and other classes of people since the 7th century.

Yet, these claims dehumanize India’s Muslims and attack their right to have rights. “There is a difference between real and converted Muslims. Indian Muslims are converted Muslims, so they deserve the hatred, and we only want to engage with the real Muslims,” is the argument.

These arguments make the ethnic/racial backend of a religious frontend obvious. “Purity” is connected to blood. It is lineage, according to these logics, that makes a Muslim “real” (if born to an Arabized family) or “fake” (if born to a family racialized as South Asian). If this does not already stand out, it also should be clear that this is a projection of the caste hierarchy and how it is only passed down by blood, too, and how these things that are supposedly innate to people define levels of purity.  

The “fake Muslims” rhetoric reinforces the idea that we are either the product of an “invasive” Mughal class that is not indigenous to India or that we have lost some innate Indianness because we were “converted” by the Mughals and now continue to live “brainwashed.”

This ethnic idea of equating Indianness with Hinduness is not new, though these narratives are creative, and new ways of how they are communicated are constantly emerging. The essence of these ideas come from over a century old theorizing of Hindutva nationalism, much of which today echoes Savarkar’s conceptualization of true Indians as being only Hindus.

These narratives increasingly adapt to the contemporary populist scenarios (populism referring to divisive politics that claims to be “for the good people” against “the corrupt”) by using colloquial symbolic terms, such as the image of a “converted Muslim,” and other co-opted terms that are given negative connotations, such as Mullah, Madarasa, and Peaceful. See for example the following claim that is used frequently to ridicule dissenters:

                “Admin learned this from Madarasa, lol.”

The interpretation of Indian Muslims as invaders in this sense also supports the idea of religious territorialism. The claim is that the Muslims in India do not territorially belong here—they are both “fake Muslims” and outside of India. Yet, it is not the nationalist’s concern where these Muslims go. What they assert is that India deserves to be a Hindu state because:

                “…Muslims have Mecca and Christians have Vatican.”

                “…there are many Islamic countries but not one Hindu Rashtra.”

                “Minorities are safer than Hindus …”

In India’s populism, it is often the hierarchical systems—politicians, organizations, and their media—that impose these thoughts. However, we are now at a stage where the common public themselves spread these narratives, making them seem grassroots-like—a testament to Hindutva’s radicalization process.

Hindutva nationalists increasingly outright reject dissenters’ thoughts based on their identity and a synthesized mythical belief that Hindus and only Hindus need to be safeguarded in the territory of India, rendering others as outsiders and invaders.

This is not a defense of other ethnocentric states, but one that highlights that the existence of those other states is weaved into the Hindutva argumentation of the worldview to justify the creation of their own state. One of the strengths of Hindutva is this fluid nature. It is a political project that is not necessarily committed to minute -isms that can be associated with things like left-wing politics, American evangelicalism, etc. It is what allows the ultranationalist community to be caste-blind when Muslims are rendered the enemy but exercise caste hierarchies and violence in their internal practice and discourse. 

The popularity and strength of these narratives are especially concerning, given that they came out of nowhere and have no basis in historical knowledge nor in how Islamic society works. One of the main features of how Islam posits the structure of the social fabric is to not discriminate based on identity. Yet, we see an interpretation of Muslims by Hindutva in a casteist light. Similarly, the religious territorial claims rely on sweeping generalizations regarding how other countries work and who they are safe for; they also rely on outright lies about India’s social and political history.

The populism of Hindutva in the last 10 years is such that the politicians, and now the people, too, are able to construct “facts” based on what they collectively literally consider true based on vibe. Whatever matches their world view is fact, and everything else is the evil Congress, Muslims, liberal Hindus, Goerge Soros, the West, terrorist, anti-India, or the propaganda spreader.

The result is dehumanizing language, such as the ones documented in this article or others that rest on these assumptions, to make dissenters feel uncomfortable, scared, and exiled, and to induce fear and a call-to-action for ultranationalists to continue their political and extrajudicial activities.

There is only so much I can convey in a short article. But there are so many entities implicated in the factors that continue allowing for this discourse to spread.

The first step is to understand that these problems exist. The reason I am posting this on Republic Day is precisely because this is a commemorative day. On 26th January and 15th August, many of us have the privilege to smile and celebrate the successes of our freedoms and constitution. But for whom are these freedoms and who really feels safe and free?

This is not a call to not celebrate, but one that calls to critically celebrate. Many of us still do not believe that state-sponsored Hindutva religious territorialism exists in India. I am often told that my claims are exaggerations of exceptional events, which is simply not true. Our constitution demands that we engage in intellectual endeavours, stand up for our people, and question the government in the means guaranteed: this is my reminder today, on republic day.

Another thought pertains to the social media landscape, a space that we often characterize as an open space for speech, but need to remember as a product that has algorithms that indeed do not give every “speech” an equal chance of being presented, algorithms that do not treat all forms of “hate speech” as the same: some are okay, but others are not. 

There is a need for content moderators contextually and culturally trained with Indian discourse across languages, given that the terms used in the dehumanizing language are often inexplicit and cannot confidently be taken down by machine learning models. Real-time moderation teams should operate during sensitive periods, such as during festivals and elections. This also echoes the repeated calls for platforms like Meta to ensure content moderation teams are not pro-Hindutva themselves, as is often the case. Decentralizing fact-checking as did X might be a potential route to this.

However, at the same time, the broader rhetoric around “absolute freedom” is also counterproductive, as on platforms with algorithms and financial interests, there simply isn’t a level playing field for all speech.

Finally, writing this from the United States, I cannot ignore the role of diaspora Indians in supporting ultranationalist discourse and financial support from abroad. The Hindutva ecosystem is supported and recreated in many forms outside India, too. Over the last few months, I have already encountered ethnic Indians who are American nationals and have never been to India. Some of these people cannot even speak Hindi or another Indian language properly; yet they claim that perhaps I dissent against the government because I do not live in the BJP constituencies; or that I am simply spreading propaganda. These were mundane interactions, but ultranationalists lend support in many other ways.

We owe it to our country to continue observing, engaging with, and documenting such forms of support that diasporic communities lend to ultranationalism. And from a country like the USA, the ultranationalist Hindutva agenda needs to be understood in connection with other liberation movements; it is the capitalist structure that unites all of them that enables such a strong right-wing unity against the left.

To truly understood the core of these problems, we also necessarily have to engage with other movements that are trying to fight the root of the problems. Student power, the struggles in Philippines, Palestine, Cuba, Venezuela, Hawaii, Europe, and so many more are linked. Even national issues like the U.S. housing crisis, insurance issues, and wage slavery are tied together in this web.

In conclusion, the rhetoric of Hindutva nationalism, exemplified by the constructed binaries of “real” versus “fake” Muslims, is a strategic exercise in exclusion and control. It weaponizes religion to define Indianness in narrow, ethnoreligious terms while cloaking deeper socioeconomic agendas rooted in caste and class. This ideology not only marginalizes minorities but also thrives on dehumanizing dissenters and distorting historical narratives to maintain its dominance.

Addressing this complex ecosystem requires a multifaceted approach, including culturally aware content moderation, critical diaspora engagement, and a commitment to solidarity with global and local liberation movements. Only by confronting these interconnected systems of oppression can we hope to reclaim spaces for inclusive dialogue and justice.

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